Iran-US Talks: Why Verification Is the Hardest Part of Any Nuclear Deal

History suggests that the hardest part of any nuclear agreement is not reaching it — it is verifying it. And the current Iran-US talks in Geneva are already wrestling with the verification challenge in its most complex form: how to inspect nuclear facilities that have been physically damaged by military strikes, with inspectors who currently lack full access, on a timeline that is inherently uncertain.
Iran’s nuclear sites were hit by US bombing campaigns. A small number of IAEA inspectors remain in the country but have limited knowledge of the extent of the damage or of the number of centrifuges that could be rapidly reactivated. Previous discussions in Cairo on the inspection protocols that would govern IAEA access to these sites broke down — a significant failure that has not yet been resolved.
Both sides separately met with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi in the days surrounding Tuesday’s Geneva session — Iran’s team the day before, the US team the same day. The parallel meetings underscore how central verification has become to both delegations, and how much depends on the IAEA’s ability to credibly monitor any agreement.
Foreign Minister Araghchi described the Geneva session as “more constructive” than the first and said agreement had been reached on guiding principles. A third meeting is expected in two weeks, at which written proposals would be exchanged. Those texts will need to address the verification framework in detail — who inspects what, when, with what notice, and with what rights to follow up on anomalies.
Any deal that lacks a credible verification mechanism is unlikely to survive contact with reality. The US, in particular, having watched a previous agreement unravel partly because of verification disputes, will demand a robust inspection regime. Iran’s challenge is to offer enough access to satisfy that demand without accepting a level of intrusion it considers a sovereignty violation.